reality brought about a change in the Brazilian government's foreign policy strategy. It is important to analyse what were Brazil's real gains (e.g. political, economic, institutional and symbolic) in the 2000s, as well as to discuss the Brazilian foreign policy strategy arising from the adverse scenario of the 2010s. This article is not intended as a detailed study of the Brazilian position in the various international forums dedicated to financial issues; it focuses, rather, on a wider debate about the Brazilian government's strategy in the financial system and the factors that influence it. The argument here is that the Brazilian government decided to take advantage of the favourable circumstances at the beginning of this century in order to emphasise actions at the multilateral level, but given the difficulty of maintaining its chosen strategy, its foreign policy began to favour other gameboards, without detriment to the advances gained in multilateralism.
The article is divided into three parts, in addition to this introduction: 01. a description of the international scene in the immediate post-crisis and the debate about the Brazilian option for multilateralism; 02. an overview of the systemic and domestic factors that led to the retraction of incentives to multilateralism and to a consequent shift of emphasis; and 03. some concluding remarks. The article is based on a literature review of the subject, an analysis of official documents, and on interviews with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Central Bank of Brazil, and the Ministry of Finance (Annex 1). All interviews were conducted by the author, on three occasions: in 2012 and 2013, as part of the research for a Master's degree; and in May 2015, for the elaboration of this article. Some of the interviews have requested to remain anonymous.
The immediate post-crisis situation and the option for multilateralism
This section focuses on a political analysis of the initial consequences of the 2008 financial crisis and on countries' responses to it. It also explores the factors that motivated Brazilian government's choice to emphasise working at the multilateral level.
Due to space limitations, this article does not engage with the technical debate about this issue, but prioritises instead a political analysis of these factors.
The 2008 financial crisis, unlike previous ones, had its origin in the global shadow banking system. Such shadow market consists of several financial institutions (such as investment banks, insurance companies and other financial agents) that were not covered by the Basel II agreement, which represented the banking supervision standards at the time (CORAZZA, 2005) . Basel II was created based on the neoliberal
The role of Brazil in the multilateral financial system: an analysis of domestic and structural factors (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2017) 11 (3) e0004 -4/19 principle of self-regulation, as it advocated that financial institutions would be the actors most appropriate to monitor themselves and their financial operations, thus creating a system in which financial actors were their own judges (CARVALHO and SANTOS, 2008) .
Generally, governments' first responses to the crisis took place in the domestic sphere, in order to restore liquidity and confidence to the markets, to stimulate demand and prevent tax evasion (FARHI and CINTRA, 2009) . A number of countries' governments launched bail-out packages and, in an unprecedented move, offered assistance to the agents of shadow markets. Among the various actions devised to prevent tax evasion, one of the measures having the greatest impact in the international arena was the US domestic package (with extraterritorial effects) called 'Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act'. Despite their importance, these unilateral measures were not sufficient to restore liquidity and confidence in the financial system; the international norms were facing a true legitimacy crisis (STUENKEL, 2013) . The collapse of Lehman Brothers demonstrated the inadequacy of the financial sector's international rules to prevent the crisis. Northern countries, whose participation in the development of international regulations had been quite significant, were the hardest hit by the effects of the crisis. Emerging countries, which historically had demanded the reform of financial institutions, were less affected at first. In this scenario, the major countries reckoned that it was imperative to step up the debate on financial issues and to establish a dialogue with the South (BRANCO et al., 2012; DOCTOR, 2015) .
The legitimacy crisis has affected not only the regime, but also Northern countries, the empowerment of emerging countries, which had dominance over the financial regime. In addition, macroeconomic stabilisation and the equalisation of foreign debt created a favourable domestic scenario. The Brazilian government estimated it was a good opportunity to strengthen its actions at the multilateral level.
There was an understanding that Brazil should invest in the reform of existing multilateral institutions, rather than going around them. The search for reform of the decision-making process in international forums, in order to bring more plurality and representativeness to these institutions, had long been a demand of the South -voiced, for example, by the G77, the Non-Aligned Movement, in the proposals for a New
International Economic Order, and in the Blue Book of the G24 (LIMA, 2005; MILANI and DUARTE, 2015; VIEIRA, 2012) .
The option to prioritise the multilateral level could be explained by several factors, but two of them are arguably more prominent. Firstly, according to the Itamaraty's official narrative, there is the Brazilian predilection for multilateralism (AMORIM, 2011) . Multilateral negotiations have the potential to generate a stronger positive impact on global development, but particularly in Brazil, due to the diversity of the country's international relations both in sectoral and geographical terms (BRANCO et al., 2012) . If successful, the Brazilian government's quest for reform of the decisionmaking process could get Brazil a place at the negotiating table on international norms.
Secondly, besides providing a formal channel for Brazil to pursue its interests, the country's participation in international institutions also generates symbolic capital. By increasing its participation in these forums, there is prestige to be obtained from sitting alongside the major world powers and being recognised as a responsible country by them, in addition to the returns in terms of voting power (DOCTOR, 2015) . Therefore, the occasion seemed ripe for Brazil to strengthen its quest for reform of multilateral financial institutions, in order to reduce the overrepresentation of the North.
Having made the option for multilateralism, it was then necessary to reform domestic institutions in order to enable a repoliticisation of Brazilian foreign policy . Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, foreign policy for the financial sector came up against some strong systemic constraints. In the international scene, neoliberal ideology was gathering force through the ever more common structural adjustment plans. Domestically, the debt crisis and high inflation rates forced the Brazilian government to seek international financial assistance. During that period, the Brazilian foreign policy's core goal for the financial sector was to negotiate international commitment packages, basically as a result of the country's need for financing and economic recovery. While Brazil was going through these difficulties, there was very little room or legitimacy for it to demand greater participation in international forums.
Therefore, the actors who had good mastery of technical terms and the ability to negotiate these issues were given precedence in the formulation of foreign policy. The has not attained its initial goals and expectations. Expanding her analysis to the financial system in general, it is possible to identify some additional factors that can be summarised in five topics: 01. the lack of consensus on important and long-term issues;
02. the conservative stance of Northern countries, not ready to give up their established institutional power; 03. the lack of enforcement power of the financial sector's international institutions; 04. international events in other agendas that caused the political game to change; and 05. different levels of growth and economic recovery.
Even in the immediate post-crisis period, the discussions about the multilateral measures that should be taken came up against conflicting views. In the G20, there was Germany's position, in favour of austerity; then there was the one led by the United States, which advocated growth with moderate government incentives; and then the (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2017) 11 (3) e0004 -8/19
emerging countries' position, supporting some non-neoliberal policies for development (BRANCO, 2013 ). Due to the high level of dissent, a significant number of the measures implemented were focusing on short-term only. Something similar occurred in the FSB, where only those issues in which there was reasonable consensus between the countries managed to take off (FARHI, 2011) . The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated the obvious need to increase the reserve requirement for universal banks, as well as to monitor and regulate the actions of the shadow market. Consequently, steps in this direction were sanctioned, as opposed to more ambitious projects such as taxing foreign exchange transactions or exerting greater control over hedge funds.
Besides the lack of consensus on relevant issues, the reforms also stumbled upon the North's conservative attitude. In this sense, the 5-year delay of the US Congress in sanctioning the IMF quotas reform, which was approved in 2010, can be considered properly symbolic. The renewed strengthening of the G7 can also be cited as an example of the Global North's resistance to debates about the international agenda becoming more plural and participatory. After a period in the early 21 st century when some discussions were brought to the expanded G8 (which counted with the participation of emerging countries as guests), and the subsequent rise of the G20 to summit forum level (with the participation of countries of the South as full members), the G7 represents a return to a less plural stage.
It also worth noticing that the fact that international agencies have not fully addressed the reforms is a result of their institutional nature. The financial sector institutions have no empowerment tools (BRANCO, 2013) . Many decisions taken in international forums are recommendations or agreements between the members, with long lead times for compliance. The informality of the G20 just compounds this situation.
Unlike other institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the FSB, the G20 is not a highly-institutionalised organisation; it has no headquarters, no constituent treaty and therefore it is not a legal entity before international law. The topics discussed at the G20 vary according to the interests and the commitment of the country that holds the rotating presidency (VIANA and CINTRA, 2010) .
The global political landscape has also changed significantly due to factors external to the financial agenda, which have interfered in the relations between some important countries in international relations. The crisis in Syria directly affected the discussions at the G20 summit in St. Petersburg. Given the political discomfort caused by SMYTH, 2014) . Thus, the emerging countries -which, in regards to some subjects, have Russia as an ally in multilateral forums -had to mobilise themselves to counter the Australian proposal, rather than focusing on joint proposals for the financial sector.
As a result of Russia's political isolation, the emerging countries lost political capital in the financial forums. But their dwindling influence was also due to economic reasons. With the economic recovery gathering pace, the G20 lost its protagonism.
Moreover, economic recovery takes place at different speeds in different places, and this generates little incentive for the countries' willingness to cooperate (BRANCO, 2013).
The economies of some Northern countries -such as the United States and the United Kingdom -returned to their pre-crisis levels. Other countries took the opposite direction, such as Greece, and they still find themselves in critical circumstances. The same reasoning can be applied to the emerging countries, which have begun to feel more intensely the effects of the crisis: some less (as is the case of China and India) and others more (such as Brazil). The logic 2 behind this argument is based on an understanding that when countries are going through difficulties, they tend to seek solutions together.
However, once the critical situation is overcome the willingness to cooperate decreases.
The Brazilian economy has been grappling with the impacts of the global financial crisis, particularly since 2013. This is made worse by the fall in commodity prices, as it affects Brazil's trade surplus achieved mainly at the end of the first decade of this century. In the face of an adverse economic scenario, President Dilma Rousseff announced on May 22, 2015 the largest budget cuts ever made in the history of the Brazilian government, in nominal terms. Such measures were the start of a significant economic crisis in Brazil,
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The systemic constraints in the second decade of this century are rather more rigid than those seen in the previous decade. In addition, the situation of the domestic economy and the budget cuts also reduce Brazil's capacity to act autonomously abroad.
Faced with a turnaround in the domestic and international scenarios, the country needs to reassess its priorities and strategies to match the scarce resources available. This does not mean that its foreign policy is no longer active, but the realisation that the environment that had encouraged the Brazilian emphasis on the international scene is not the same. The difference between ex-President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's profile in promoting presidential diplomacy, and that of his successor should also be considered.
However, it is difficult to gauge how significant this factor is, as the external constraints in each government period are considerably different. It should be noted that other emerging countries (such as China, India and South Africa) have not been standing out in the multilateral setting either, which suggests that the changes did not take place only in the Brazilian domestic environment. It seems that in the early 21 st century there was a propitious time to push for reforms in the international decision-making system, but that this window of opportunity has passed, as well as the period of strong domestic economic growth. Faced with different scenarios and limited opportunities, the government decided to reconsider the strategy.
With fewer incentives at the global multilateral level, the Rousseff's government has started to emphasise other levels, such as inter-regional coordination and bilateral negotiations. At the inter-regional level, the relationship between Brazil and the other countries that make up the BRICS group should be highlighted. The BRICS countries have different capabilities, characteristics, trajectories and interests (e.g. economic model, political organisation, energy matrix, the export basket composition, economic growth and military power), but they have found common ground in the quest for reform of the decision-making process of international institutions in order to achieve greater political protagonism (MILANI et al., 2015) .
Discussions about the creation of a development bank of the BRICS, which had been going on for some time, gained momentum at the Durban summit in 2013 (ABDENUR and FOLLY, 2015) . The BRICS Development Bank (BNB) was presented by (MILANI et al., 2015) . When the actors' interests are met by the norms in place, there is little incentive to create alternatives to them. Documents signed at the 6 th BRICS Summit of heads of state and government 4 hint at the fact that the BNB, despite being at its early stages, was created in order to forge robust institutions. The BNB charter 5 states that the bank will promote infrastructure and sustainable development projects in the BRICS and in other countries through South-South cooperation. Thus, the BNB would perform a function similar to the World Bank's.
The creation of the BNB was much celebrated and won some notoriety, but it was not the only important arrangement for the financial sector at the BRICS summit. The role of Brazil in the multilateral financial system: an analysis of domestic and structural factors (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2017) 11 (3) e0004 -12/19
that Brazil is part of a movement which aims to create alternatives to the existing international system, since the latter has been blocking the agenda of reforms.
In addition to the inter-regional level, the Brazilian government has also started to put more emphasis on bilateral negotiations. The Foreign Ministry clauses (such as clauses on national treatment, on most favoured nation, and on compensation for investment expropriation), but do not include indirect expropriation clauses 14 . Moreover, beyond the usual arbitration measures of conflict resolution, the CAFI model allows for the creation of intergovernmental dialogue mechanisms, in order to give priority to dialogue over dispute. Finally, as the name of the agreement suggests, there is a strong element of cooperation between Brazil and the other countries. The CAFI seeks to identify, through dialogue with the partner country, which issues require more investment and to create favourable conditions to encourage investments geared towards the partner's development.
These Brazilian activities at the inter-regional and bilateral level prove that the Brazilian government is not inert in the international arena. Given the changes at the domestic and systemic levels, and the diminished capacity to adopt an autonomous and prominent foreign policy, the Brazilian government concluded that it was necessary to seek alternatives to the multilateral framework. It has emphasised its participation in signing investment facilitation agreements, as well as in the creation of inter-regional financial institutions. There is also a political and symbolic dimension to all this, in that the Brazilian government sends an unwritten message to its partners in South-South cooperation, and to countries of the North as well, reiterating the principles that Brazil values most (such as respect for sovereignty, solidarity and the right to development).
These actions, beyond the political and symbolic point they make when creating new rules and institutions based on principles of South-South cooperation, also have a strategic economic aspect. This institutional framework ensures resources and security for the internationalisation of Brazilian capital, giving support to Brazilian companies in order to promote international business.
It is important to point out that despite the turnaround in the international scenario, and the consequent change in the Brazilian government's strategy, the gains obtained in the first decade of this century were not negligible nor have they been reversed. International institutions in the financial sector continue to be dominated by ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 14 Indirect expropriation clauses are often used by companies to sue the state when they feel aggrieved by any government act that is not direct expropriation. For example, companies that feel aggrieved by the revocation of licenses to perform their function; by revocation of operating concessions for a given service; by an import ban on materials considered harmful, but that are important inputs for a given company; and by new environmental regulations that can make the company's activity less profitable.
The role of Brazil in the multilateral financial system: an analysis of domestic and structural factors (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2017) 11 ( It is important to demystify two points that a more premature analysis might suggest. First, this article argues against the existence of a paralysis in Brazilian foreign policy in the second decade of this century. The context has changed and, consequently, Brazil's capacity to implement an active and proud foreign policy has been reduced.
Furthermore, presidential diplomacy has also become less frequent, which pushes international issues out of the spotlight. However, foreign policy continues to be made within the Foreign Ministry and other institutions of the Brazilian bureaucracy, as can be seen in the preparation and negotiation of the CAFI model, as well as in the participation in new international institutions such as the BNB and the CRA. The second point that must be refuted is that the option for multilateralism did not yield any fruit. It can be argued that the gains were short of the expectations and interests of some Brazilian players, but there were political, institutional and symbolic gains nevertheless, which
were not reversed in the second decade of this century.
The change of strategy does not mean that Brazil has lost interest in multilateralism; it only reveals that the Brazilian government has judged that it would be necessary to pursue its objectives by other means. Even the G20 has lost prominence and importance in the financial system, especially in face of the economic recovery in some countries of the North and the emergence of other issues (e.g. Syria, Ukraine, Ebola, etc.). Even though they are important, these other agendas compete with economic issues in the G20 discussions. If various themes become high priority, then all cease to be prominent. Considering the intensification of systemic constraints post-2010, one must ask how much weight Brazilian government has had on this change in strategy. Brazil is not the only emerging country that has been operating with less enthusiasm in multilateral financial forums since the second decade of this century. It is possible that internal government changes also explain the change in the international position of these countries, but the common thread is the systemic factor. The demand for reform of the decision-making process of the international financial system continues to be made through political and symbolic counterpoints, quite visible in the
The role of Brazil in the multilateral financial system: an analysis of domestic and structural factors (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2017) 11 ( This article is a contribution to the general analysis of Brazil's role in the multilateral financial system. No attempt was made here of a technical analysis of the Brazilian position in every international forum of the financial agenda in which the country takes part, such as the G20, the IMF, the World Bank, the BNB and the FSB.
However, this issue could be the object of future research, which might investigate the domestic actors' activities in the field of foreign policy formulation for the financial sector. In Person and Phone ¹ Interviewees have stressed that their participation in this research is based on their personal opinions and not necessarily the official position of the Central Bank. ² The interviewee talked to researchers informally, but was not able to answer the questions formally. ³ All the interviews took place between November 2012 and January 2013, except for the interview with Samo Gonçalves, which took place in May 2015. Other diplomats were interviewed in 2015, but they requested anonymity.
